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regulations for consideration and formal 
approval by the Office of Administrative 
Law concerning the statewide dispute 
resolution program. The final set of pro-
posed regulations developed pursuant to 
the Dispute Resolution Programs Act 
(Business and Professions Code section 
465 et seq.) is expected to be submitted 
in the next few months in final form. 
(See CRLR Vol. 9, No. 2 (Spring 1989) 
p. 40 for background information.) 
LEGISLATION: 
AB 1770 (Roos), as amended May 9, 
would prohibit a consumer credit report 
or investigative consumer report from 
containing the following information: (I) 
the fact that a consumer was represented 
or assisted by a legal aid, legal services 
program, or other governmental source; 
(2) the fact that a consumer was granted 
a waiver of court or other fees. Currently 
pending on the Assembly floor, this bill 
would permit consumers to delegate to 
any person pursuant to a power of attor-
ney any right provided to consumer un-
der the Consumer Credit Reporting Agen-
cies or the Investigative Consumer 
Reporting Agencies Act. 
AB 1523 (Hansen), as amended May 
16, is pending in the Assembly Ways 
and Means Committee. Existing law pro-
vides that funds of one board within the 
DCA shall not be used to pay expenses 
of any other board when it will interfere 
with administrative duties imposed upon 
such boards. This bill would provide 
that those provisions shall not prohibit 
monies from being transferred for a re-
lease time bank of any board, commis-
sion, or bureau pursuant to memorandum 
of understanding. 
AB 1272 (Eastin) would include 
among the enumerated powers and duties 
of the DCA Director the maintenance 
of contact and liaison with the consumer 
programs of each state agency. This bill 
is pending in the Assembly Committee 
on Governmental Efficiency and Con-
sumer Protection. 
AB 459 (Frizze/le), also pending in 
the Assembly Committee on Government-
al Efficiency and Consumer Protection, 
would provide that any business license 
issued by a licensing agency within the 
DCA may be renewed at any time, regard-
less of length of delinquency, without 
meeting reexamination requirements if 
continuing education requirements have 
been met and all applicable dues are paid. 
AB 1578 (Murray) would authorize 
a landlord to evict a tenant in unlawful 
detainer proceedings for any controlled 
substance violation on the rental premis-
es, if the rental agreement prohibits 
violations of law on the rental premises. 
Under the bill, the tenant would also 
forfeit any security deposit to the land-
lord in such cases. This bill is pending in 
the Assembly Judiciary Committee. 
AB 1526 (Bentley) is pending in the 
Assembly Committee on Public Safety. 
Existing law requires employers of peace 
officers in the state to establish a proced-
ure to investigate citizen complaints 
against their personnel and to make a 
written description of the procedures 
available to the public. This bill would 
authorize those investigative procedures 
to provide for the disclosure to the com-
plainant as to the disposition of those 
complaints. 
AB 1729 (Chandler) is pending in 
the Assembly Ways and Means Commit-
tee. Existing law provides that a board 
regulating a business or profession may 
deny, suspend, revoke, or restrict a li-
cense on the ground that an applicant 
or licensee has subverted or attempted 
to subvert any licensing examination. 
This bill would make it a misdemeanor 
for any person to subvert or attempt to 
subvert any examination, in addition to 
any disciplinary action that may be author-
ized. Such person would be held liable 
for costs incurred by an agency in an 
amount not to exceed $10,000 and for 
the costs incurred for the prosecution, 
in addition to any other penalties. 
AB 1529 (Lancaster), DCA's omni-
bus legislation which would make numer-
ous technical changes in statutory law 
affecting specified DCA agencies, is pend-
ing in the Assembly Ways and Means 
Committee. 
SB 1078 (Dills) is pending in the 
Senate Judiciary Committee. Existing 
law provides that anyone who violates 
provisions pertaining to unlawful, unfair, 
or fraudulent business practices is liable 
for civil penalties not to exceed $2,500 
for each violation recovered in a civil 
action. This bill would provide that a 
penalty shall not be assessed against the 
person if the person has paid fines or 
penalties or has otherwise settled charges 
pursuant to a violation of any other 
civil or criminal law which is based on 
the same underlying conduct constituting 
the unfair competition. 
The following is a status update of 
bills discussed in detail in CRLR Vol. 9, 
No. 2 (Spring 1989) at page 40: 
AB 538 (Moore), as amended in 
April, no longer applies to DCA. The 
new version of the bill would require an 
electric or gas corporation proposing to 
establish a promotional rate, discount, 
or rebate program for the purpose of 
competing with another electric or gas 
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corporation, or with a utility owned by 
a local governmental entity, to first ob-
tain authorization from the Public Utili-
ties Commission. Provisions appearing 
in the original version of the bill, which 
would have required DCA to comply 
with certain legislative reporting require-
ments regarding electronic commercial 
services operations, were deleted. 
SB 787 (Rosenthal), pertaining to 
disclosure requirements in the sale of a 
used car, is still pending in the Senate 
Committee on Insurance, Claims and 
Corporations. This bill would prohibit 
the sale of a used car by a dealer unless 
accompanied by an express written war-
ranty covering the full costs of both 
parts and labor necessary to repair any 
defect that impairs the motor vehicle's 
use or safety. 
AB 552 (Moore), which would author-
ize the buyer of a motor vehicle, pursuant 
to a conditional sales contract or pur-
chase order, to cancel the agreement 
within three days after signing the agree-
ment, is still pending in the Assembly 
Committee on Governmental Efficiency 
and Consumer Protection. 
AB 320 (Speier), which would permit 
the buyer of a dating service or weight 
loss contract to cancel the contract within 
three business days after signing, passed 
the Assembly and is pending in the Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee. 
AB 718 (Frazee), which would ex-
pand the disclosure rights of consumers 
who lease vehicles, passed the Assembly 




Director: Steve Thompson 
(916) 445-1638 
Established in 1966, the Assembly 
Office of Research (AOR) brings together 
legislators, scholars, research experts and 
interested parties from within and outside 
the legislature to conduct extensive stud-
ies regarding problems facing the state. 
Under the direction of the Assembly's 
bipartisan Committee on Policy Research, 
AOR investigates current state issues 
and publishes reports which include long-
term policy recommendations. Such in-
vestigative projects often result in legis-
lative action, usually in the form of bills. 
AOR also processes research requests 
from Assemblymembers. Results of these 
short-term research projects are confiden-
tial unless the requesting legislators author-
ize their release. 
31 
I UJ INTERNAL GOVERNMENT REVIEW OF AGENCIES 
32 
MAJOR PROJECTS: 
California Children, California Fami-
lies is a series of publications undertaken 
at the request of Assembly Speaker Willie 
Brown, Jr. The series is designed to 
heighten public and legislative awareness 
of recent demographic trends and their 
effects on families; establish a system 
for tracking bills impacting families; and 
spotlight trends and policies which are 
adversely affecting families and which 
need legislative attention. 
In March 1989, AOR published the 
first of the series, entitled More Than 
Babysitting: Rethinking Childcare and 
Preschool Policies. The report examines 
the history of childcare development in 
California and analyzes the current pro-
grams which cost the state one-half 
billion dollars per year. Suggesting broad 
approaches for reconciling conflicting 
policies, the report discusses the need to 
establish better priorities for the care 
and education of young children and 
includes -some specific recommendations 
for implementing such policies. 
The state of California supports more 
than twenty childcare and education pro-
grams in five different departments. 
These programs run the gamut from 
daycare centers licensed by the Depart-
ment of Social Services; Department of 
Education-subsidized preschool and child-
care programs; community childcare pro-
grams targeting specific populations; 
programs which provide childcare to 
families in need of welfare assistance; 
programs which subsidize childcare for 
welfare recipients in work or training 
programs; and consumer and technical 
assistance programs for parents and 
caregivers. 
The report criticizes the state for 
having no coherent policy and no agreed-
upon set of priorities to govern state 
spending for childcare. Citing studies 
which demonstrate that low-income chil-
dren who attend preschool programs tend 
to be more successful in their later lives 
than children who do not attend such 
programs, the report states that only 
25% of children aged three and four 
who qualify for subsidized preschool pro-
grams are actually being served. Despite 
the increased need for services and the 
demonstrated success, in order to provide 
half-day preschool programs to those 
currently not served, it would cost ap-
proximately $591 million (almost $100 
million more than the state currently 
spends on all preschool and childcare 
programs for children up to age fourteen). 
For many California families, child-
care is expensive and difficult to find. 
Moreover, although the supply of licensed 
childcare spaces has grown substantially 
over the past ten years, it remains in- · 
adequate to meet a growing demand, 
especially of families with infants under 
two years of age and school-aged chil-
dren six to thirteen years old. 
The report recommends several ways 
to approach these problems while recog-
nizing limited available resources. First, 
it recommends that licensing regulations 
be changed so that all childcare facilities 
would be required to provide a preschool 
curriculum. Second, it recommends a 
vast expansion of the Department of 
Education's part- and full-day preschool 
programs, or in the alternative, that the 
state encourage development of state/ 
local, public/private coalitions which can 
share in the costs of providing and pay-
ing for childcare services to families. 
Finally, the report urges that care and 
education of California's young children 
become a top priority for policymakers 
at every level of government. 
In April, AOR published the second 
report of the series, entitled Foster Care: 
Fraught With Data Gaps and Inadequate 
Services. The prevailing belief underlying 
both federal and state intervention to 
dysfunctional families is that only under 
extreme circumstances should a child be 
removed from his/her home. The goals 
of intervention are to prevent displace-
ment from the home or return a child to 
his/her home with the least destructive 
intervention; and, if these are unsuccess-
ful, to ultimately prevent multiple foster 
home placement. However, a variety of 
obstacles continues to undermine the 
state's success in reducing the population 
of children in out-of-home care. 
Several kinds of foster care are avail-
able in California. The first is emergency 
shelter care (initial, short-term placement 
for children in dire need). The second is 
the private family home, which may con-
sist of county-licensed homes; certified 
homes (under the jurisdiction of private, 
licensed home-finding agencies); or resi-
dences of the child's relatives, which are 
usually not licensed. Third is the group 
home-a more structured, confined set-
ting; and finally, the large institutional-
type setting. 
The report selected eleven counties 
for preliminary investigation, focusing 
on the foster family home (county-licens-
ed homes). The counties investigated 
were Alameda, Amador, Calaveras, Con-
tra Costa, El Dorado, Los Angeles, 
Orange, Sacramento, San Diego, Santa 
Clara, and Yolo. 
The report centers on four principal 
concerns: (I) the process of deciding to 
remove a child from his/her home; (2) 
the abuse of children in foster care; (3) 
the growing interest in foster care "pro-
fessionalization" and training; and (4) 
the services available to children in foster 
homes. The report also notes that the 
data available to analyze foster care in 
California are "abysmal" and "funda-
mentally limit the State Legislature's 
ability to frame informed policy choices 
for serious consideration." 
The report identifies several problems 
related to making the decision to remove 
a child. The greatest pressure is the un-
availability of early intervention pro-
grams to high-risk families. Although 
these programs are costly, in the long-
run, early intervention programs would 
result in greater financial savings in the 
child welfare system. In addition, there 
are enormous pressures on individual 
social workers who cannot do an ade-
quate job with the huge caseloads they 
are expected to carry. 
With very few options available, once 
the decision to remove a child has been 
made, the sole criterion for placement 
becomes the location of an empty bed. 
As a result of these practices, many 
foster placements unsurprisingly result 
in failure. For instance, the emergency 
shelter in Los Angeles uses 50% of its 
beds for failed placements. 
Analyzing data collected by the Foster 
Care Information System (FCIS), the 
AOR study notes that the most reported 
reason for removing children from the 
home statewide is the caretaker's absence 
or incapacitation. The data system con-
tains a specific code which defines ab-
sence or incapacitation very broadly as 
"the absence of the caretaker due to 
hospitalization, incarceration, or death; 
incapacity of the caretaker to provide 
adequate care for the child due to physi-
cal or emotional illness, disabling condi-
tion, or compulsive use of alcohol or 
narcotics." 
In its report, AOR is extremely critical 
of the FCIS, stating it is confusing and 
misleading. The data is to be used to 
determine what services are needed and 
in what priority, and to determine appro-
priate funding levels. However, using 
the category described above as an ex-
ample, policymakers will have no way 
of knowing whether parents are dying at 
alarming rates, being frequently incarcer-
ated, or whether removal of children 
statewide is attributable to an increase 
in drug and alcohol addiction. 
The report characterizes abuse in fos-
ter homes as a statewide problem. The 
magnitude of the problem is currently 
unknown due to the lack of formal docu-
mentation of charges and investigation 
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of alleged abuse. Moreover, because of 
the desperate need for foster homes, 
there appears to be an increased toler-
ance for low levels of abuse if the offend-
ing person seeks treatment to correct 
the problem. 
Because of irregularities in the data, 
AOR asked four counties to perform a 
manual recheck of removals for alleged 
abuse in foster care during the year 
1987. In no case was the frequency of 
alleged or substantiated abuse higher 
than 3% in any of the four counties. The 
report concludes, however, that because 
the potential for underreporting is high, 
a more systematic investigation is called 
for, as well as the development of a 
reliable method for obtaining informa-
tion on the incidence of abuse in foster 
homes. 
While there is a growing consensus 
in favor of mandated training for foster 
parents, the report suggests that the man-
date will prove useless unless it is en-
forced. More families will remain in the 
system longer if they are better equipped 
and prepared to cope with the especially 
difficult children placed in foster care. 
The report recommends that foster fami-
lies be required to attend orientation 
training sessions as well as ongoing train-
ing as a precondition to renewal of licens-
ing. Further, AOR suggests that the en-
tire family should attend the training 
sessions and that they be paid a small 
sum for the training. 
In addition to the above, the report 
also made the following recommenda-
tions: ( 1) the state should provide social 
workers with more specific guidelines 
for determining whether a child should 
be removed from the home; (2) greater 
efforts should be made to retain person-
nel, which could be accomplished by 
reducing caseloads to a level which per-
mits supervision consistent with safe, in-
home treatment; (3) there should be a 
wide range of early intervention services 
available to high-risk families ( of chil-
dren who receive in-home services, nine 
out of ten remain in their homes); (4) 
the state should provide direct assistance 
to counties in addressing the dire need 
for massive recruitment of new foster 
parents; and (5) a thorough review of 
data collection procedures should be 
undertaken. 
The Thrift Industry: History and 
Background (April 1989). This report 
describes the development of the savings 
and loan industry. Formed in the North-
east during the early 1800s, cooperative 
savings societies and mutual savings 
banks were developed to finance home 
mortgages and provide safe depositories 
for personal savings. These societies and 
savings banks were the forerunners to 
today's savings and loans institutions. 
The S&L industry has played a major 
role among the nation's financial institu-
tions, especially during the building boom 
of the 1920s. At the beginning of the 
Depression, however, the industry was 
governed by a hodgepodge of state regula-
tions; by the end of the Depression, 
S&Ls found themselves holding massive 
amounts of repossessed devalued prop-
erty. In 1933, 40% of the nation's $20 
billion in home mortgage loans were in 
default and more than I, 700 thrifts or 
S&Ls failed. 
Federal regulation of the S&L indus-
try began in 1932 with the Federal Home 
Loan Bank Act. This act authorized a 
five-member board to establish and super-
vise a Federal Home Loan Bank System 
consisting of twelve regional home loan 
banks. Under the Act, all of the capital 
stock of a district bank is owned by the 
savings and loan associations served by 
that bank. Each bank is a federally-
chartered, privately-owned corporation 
subject to the policies and procedures 
developed by the Federal Home Loan 
Bank Board (FHLBB). 
During the S7 years since it was 
enacted, the FHLB system has fulfilled 
its original mission of providing loans 
or "advances" to its member savings 
and loans to ensure liquidity, thus mak-
ing home financing widely available. The 
bulk of the system's funding comes from 
FHLB bonds and discount notes sold in 
the public capital markets. 
Due to the failure of S&Ls during 
the Depression, Congress enacted the 
National Housing Act of 1934, which 
established the Federal Savings and Loan 
Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) to insure 
accounts for up to $5,000 and to prevent 
insured institutions from default. (In 
1980, the coverage was raised to $100,000 
per person per account.) The FSLIC's 
operations were placed under the super-
vision of the FHLBB. 
Between 1934 and 1979, it was neces-
sary for the FSLIC to assist in the merg-
er, sale, or liquidation of 124 S&Ls 
nationwide. Of those, thirteen cases were 
severe enough to require closure of the 
S&L and insurance payments were made 
to the insured depositors. 
A strong economy from 1947 to 1960 
contributed to· rapid growth in the S&L 
industry. The use of national financial 
transactions and the secondary mortgage 
market were important trends which also 
contributed to the industry's growth. 
However, with increased competition, 
higher interest rates, and declining earn-
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ings, the industry began to experience 
problems in the 1960s. 
In 1970, the Emergency Home Finance 
Act established the Federal Home Loan 
Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC or "Fred-
die Mac"), which created an increased 
supply of funds for housing by stimulat-
ing a secondary market for mortgages. 
Inflation and a large increase in the 
number of rules governing S&L lending 
practices had a huge impact on the indus-
try in the 1970s. In California, the big-
gest impact was the decision in Wellen-
kamp v. Bank of America that private 
lenders in California could not use 
"due-on-sale" clauses in loan agreements 
to prevent purchasers of residential real 
estate from assuming mortgages at low-
interest rates. Finally, in the late 1970s, 
the FHLBB authorized S&Ls to institute 
variable rate mortgages. 
In the 1980s, stagnation in deposit 
levels occurred because savers could get 
a much higher return from money market 
funds, stocks, savings accounts permit-
ting limited checking, and other financial 
instruments. As a result, hundreds of 
S&Ls became insolvent or at risk of 
becoming insolvent. 
In response, Congress passed the De-
pository Institutions Deregulation and 
Monetary Control Act of 1980. The Act 
eliminated interest rate lids that thrifts 
could pay depositors, raised the deposit 
insurance to $100,000, and allowed S&Ls 
to reduce their capital to 4% of their 
total assets. Despite the authority to 
offer higher interest rates and adjustable 
rate mortgages to attract new depositors, 
many S&Ls were locked into thirty-year 
fixed rate mortgages which were paying 
the S&Ls lower interest than they were 
having to pay their depositors. As a 
result, between 1980 and 1983, almost 
500 S&Ls failed across the country. 
In 1982, Congress passed the Garn-
St. Germain Depository Institutions Act, 
which authorized a wider range of invest-
ments previously prohibited. In Califor-
nia, state-chartered S&Ls began to con-
vert to federal charters in droves because 
of the deregulation. Following the federal 
action, the state eliminated most invest-
ment restrictions on state-chartered thrifts 
in order to stem the tide of conversion. 
In 1983, the authority to examine 
California state-chartered S&Ls was turn-
ed over to the FHLBB and the FSLIC, 
which then placed a moratorium on insur-
ance for state-chartered thrifts in 1985 
until the state regulators strengthened 
the supervision of S&Ls. 
According to the AOR report, the 
new investment powers proved to be a 
mixed blessing for S&Ls because of inex-
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perienced management. Between February 
1984 and April 1987, 29 state-chartered 
institutions and two federally-chartered 
thrifts were placed into receivership by 
the FHLBB. During the mid-1980s, Cali-
fornia stiffened its regulatory control 
over S&Ls. 
At present, it is reported that there 
are thirteen insolvent state institutions 
and eleven insolvent federal institutions 
in California. In the view of the presi-
dent of the Federal Home Loan Bank of 
San Francisco, the problems in the S&L 
industry stem from " ... the present FSLIC 
deposit insurance system which creates 
incentives to engage in risk taking and 
lacks the necessary market discipline to 
control such activities .... " 
Medication Risks Among the Elderly: 
Cures, Cautions and Consequences (May 
1989). This AOR report examines senior 
citizen medication problems and the ef-
forts in California to address them. 
Nationally, an estimated 243,000 Ameri-
cans were hospitalized by an adverse 
drug reaction in 1985. In California, 
hospital discharge records demonstrate 
that 62% of reported adverse drug re-
actions to legally administered drugs 
involved patients 60 years or older. 
Researchers claim that 40-75% of the 
elderly make mistakes in administering 
their medication regimen. California hos-
pital records reveal that seniors are most 
likely to commit a medication error with 
heart drugs or benzodiazepine-based tran-
quilizers. California is part of a growing 
movement to educate senior citizens and 
caregivers on the proper administration 
of these drugs. Moreover, pharmaceutical 
manufacturers are under increasing pres-
sure to produce drugs which have been 
thoroughly tested on elderly patients to 
prevent illness or injury from adverse 
reactions. 
Studies indicate that the aging process 
limits the body's ability to absorb, dis-
tribute, and release drug agents. Thus, 
seniors suffer from drug reactions in 
proportionately greater numbers than 
other age groups. Yet, the AOR report 
notes that most drug companies custom-
arily secure FDA approval based on 
clinical studies involving healthy, young 
adults. Only 17 of the 200 most common-
ly prescribed drugs give geriatric dosage 
instructions and, of the 24 most common-
ly prescribed drugs for seniors, only three 
product labels mention geriatric adverse 
reactions. 
After documenting the risk of errors 
in senior medication problems in the 
first part of the report, the AOR study 
recommends the establishment and main-
tenance of a substantial base of informa-
tion on patterns of drug use and adverse 
drug reactions among the elderly. At 
present, there is an absence of data to 
document the severity and extent of the 
problem. Although more data is obvious-
ly needed, the AOR report includes a 
review of current data available in Cali-
fornia since 1986. 
The second part of this report exam-
ines existing medication education pro-
grams in California. The report notes 
that most education programs are sup-
ported by short-term grants, resulting in 
programs which are highly fragmented 
and tenuous. 
In 1986, law was enacted to provide 
that unused funds in the County Health 
Services Fund could be directed to medi-
cation education programs for people 
60 years of age and older for three years 
(through fiscal year 1989-90). The AOR 
study examined ten of the nineteen city 
and county medication education pro-
grams which are partially funded through 
this source, as well as other education 
programs which do not use grant funds 
for the purpose. 
The AOR study concludes that an 
accounting system is not in place to 
assess the overall cost-effectiveness of 
medication education efforts. According 
to the report, there is currently no "hard 
data" which demonstrate how many dol-
lars were saved by activities which could 
conclusively be credited for keeping some-
one out of the hospital. 
AOR recommends paying close atten-
tion to the state's two-year, $1.3 million 
drug utilization review program to evalu-
ate the outcome of drugs prescribed for 
Medi-Cal recipients. The review system 
was required to be developed by the 
state under the California Welfare and 
Institutions Code and will begin a test 
run in selected counties in July 1989. 
AOR suggests that the data gathered 
may show the extent to which medication 
is prescribed or dispensed in error and 
the impact education has on preventing 
oversights. If after two years, interven-
tion fails to produce a marked change in 
drug errors, at least the state will then 
know the difficulty in proving that medi-
cation education is cost-effective. 
In its report, AOR makes the follow-
ing specific recommendations to the legis-
lature: (I) develop data programming 
and support efforts to identify medica-
tion misuse patterns among the elderly; 
(2) monitor Medi-Cal's two-year drug 
review program to determine the cost-
effectiveness of educating physicians; (3) 
support an expansion of the role of 
pharmacists as medication managers for 
the elderly (e.g., explore methods for 
having pharmacists thoroughly explain 
the use of a prescribed drug at point of 
sale; (4) consider methods for increasing 
a physician's knowledge of prescribing 
geriatric medicine; (5) incorporate medi-
cation education efforts into the state's 
preventive health care programs for the 
elderly; and (6) develop statewide work-
shops and other means to promote an 
exchange of ideas, materials, and knowl-
edge among professionals who dispense 
medication to the elderly. 
Electricity Rates: San Diego Gas & 
Electric and Southern California Edison 
(April 1989). Requested by Assembly-
member Lucy Killea, this AOR study 
concludes that San Diegans would pay 
less for energy under the proposed take-
over of SDG&E by Southern California 
Edison than if SDG&E remains independ-
ent. The report also found that a muni-
cipal takeover of SDG&E is a feasible 
option, but additional study is needed. 
The AOR study projects that San 
Diego residential energy users would 
have lower costs than they would without 
a merger-3-11 % lower by 1993, and 
14-21% lower by 1998. The lower rates 
would be achieved in part by tapping 
into Edison's power surplus and cutting 
overhead. 
However, the report found that the 
effects of a merger are less clear with 
respect to the impact on Edison's utility 
rates. The report says that Edison's resi-
dential customer costs will be lower than 
otherwise at first, but would then become 
higher starting in about 1996. The reason 
for the higher rates is that they will be 
pulled upward by San Diego rates more 
than they will be pulled downward from 
merger savings. 
The study projects that without a 
merger, SDG&E rates will remain approx-
imately the same as Edison's until about 
1994. Then, from the late 1990s through 
2007, it is projected that SDG&E rates 
would exceed Edison's by about 17%. 
The report determined that the rate in-
crease would be attributable to major 
urban growth and a dwindling supply of 
cheap surplus electricity which would 
eventually force the utility company to 
build or acquire costly new sources of 
power. 
The study also projects that muni-
cipal takeover of SDG&E is feasible but 
needs further study. The purchase price 
of SDG&E was estimated to be between 
$4.3 billion and $5.7 billion. The study 
reports that taking reserves and other 
costs of financing into consideration, a 
bond act in the range of $4.8 billion to 
$6.4 billion would be needed to finance 
a municipal takeover. The actual price 
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of such a takeover would be set by 
negotiation, a court ruling, or the Public 
Utilities Commission, according to the 
study. Once the actual price of a muni-
cipal takeover could be established by 
further study, accurate rate projections 
could be established. 
Completed in six weeks, the AOR 
study has been criticized in the press 
because the figures supplied to AOR for 
its projections were provided by SDG&E, 
and because the report fails to factor in 
the availability of relatively cheap hydro-
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MAJOR PROJECTS: 
Report on the State's Regulation of 
Financial Institutions (February 1989). 
Produced by the Senate Advisory Com-
mission on Cost Control in State Gov-
ernment (Advisory Commission) and sub-
mitted to the Senate Rules Committee 
pursuant to SR 40 (Roberti, 1984), this 
report is the third in a series of studies 
undertaken to find ways to "increase 
efficiency, reduce costs, enhance admin-
istrative accountability and control, and 
apply improved program management 
techniques and systems to state oper-
ations." 
The substantial deregulation of the 
financial services industry over the past 
decade has invited abuse and mismanage-
ment. Changes in the financial services 
business have increased the competitive 
pressure on banks and savings and loan 
institutions (S&Ls). 
An unprecedented number of banks 
and S&Ls have failed over the past five 
years. Even if not outright failing, 37% 
of the state-chartered banks were in less 
than satisfactory financial condition and 
approximately 17% were in serious trouble 
in March 1988. Fraud was a factor in 
approximately 33% of all bank failures. 
Of the state-chartered S&Ls, 42% were 
found to be "problem[s]" upon examina-
tion by the Department of Savings and 
Loan (DSL) during fiscal year 1986-87. 
During that same period, 30% of all 
national failures of S&Ls occurred in 
California alone. Fraud was a factor in 
at least 80% of all S&L insolvencies 
between January 1984 and June 1987. 
The flood of institutional failures has 
engendered monumental problems for 
both the industry and the federal insur-
ance funds. 
Because of the potential for instabili-
ty in our financial system and the need 
to minimize the resulting adverse effects 
on California, the Advisory Commission 
concluded that the state must undertake 
"an aggressive reform program aimed at 
strengthening the supervisory abilities 
of our financial regulatory agencies"-
that is, the Department of Banking and 
the DSL. 
The Department of Banking super-
vised 389 institutions and $265 billion in 
assets in February 1988. The DSL super-
vised I 3 7 state-chartered S&Ls and 
$147.9 billion in assets in December 1987. 
The Banking Department recently adopt-
ed a "Strategic Plan '88" with "a sound 
set of goals" for meeting its regulatory 
objectives; the DSL has no such overall 
strategy for its regulatory program. In 
fact, the Advisory Commission found 
that, in light of the industry's problems, 
the DSL "had to operate under some 
significant fiscal and operational con-
straints," including an inadequate num-
ber of examiners. 
The profound changes that have taken 
place in the industry have made state 
supervision of its financial institutions 
more important and more difficult. As a 
result, the Advisory Commission believes 
that an evaluation of the powers of banks 
and S&Ls must be made. Then, based 
on the interests of California citizens 
and not industry preferences, the legisla-
ture must decide whether the present 
laws should be changed. 
The Advisory Commission made the 
following recommendations: 
(I) With regard to both departments: 
-the legislature and the departments 
must reevaluate the departments' existing 
resources and ensure that they are ade-
quate to supervise their respective li-
censees; 
-the legislature and the departments 
must create deterrents to and focus great-
er staff resources (including special fraud 
units) on fraud and misconduct, which 
are responsible for so many institutional 
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failures; 
-the departments must examine all 
licensee institutions at least once per 
year and "troubled" institutions every 
six months; 
-the departments must conduct a thor-
ough review of their information sources 
and negotiate greater access to federal 
sources; 
-the legislature and the departments 
must provide salaries and benefits to 
examiners and supervisory staff compar-
able to private sector equivalents; and 
-the departments should overhaul 
their human resources objectives by fully 
implementing Department of Personnel 
Administration (DPA) recommendations 
regarding improvement of examiner sal-
aries and benefits; requesting additional 
authority from the DPA for filling and 
reclassifying certain examiner classes; 
and reassessing whether their career coun-
seling programs are meeting the needs 
of their employees. 
(2) With regard to the Department 
of Banking: 
-the legislature should reinstate the 
$100,000 appropriation cut from the 
1988-89 budget to increase examiner 
training. 
(3) With regard to the Department 
of Savings and Loan: 
-the legislature should revise the De-
partment's funding mechanism (currently, 
assessments from the S&Ls it regulates) 
by considering larger assessments; fund-
ing from the general fund instead; sup-
plementing assessment proceeds by funds 
from the general fund; or funding through 
some other methods such as franchise 
tax offsets; 
-the legislature should shield the DSL 
Commissioner from political pressures 
by changing the office from a pleasure 
appointment to a term appointment re-
movable only for serious cause; 
-the DSL must develop an operational 
strategy analogous to the Banking De-
partment's "Strategic Plan '88"; and 
-the DSL should conduct joint exam-
inations with the Federal Home Loan 
Bank of San Francisco where it focuses 
on operating areas unique to California 
institutions. 
The Advisory Commission also recom-
mended against the consolidation of the 
two departments into a single "Depart-
ment of Financial Institutions" because 
of the substantial differences between 
the two regulatory structures and the 
experiences of sister states. 
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